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STEVEN STACK, PHD, AND FREDERIQUE LAUBEPIN, PHD
Research on religion as a protective factor has been marked by four
recurrent limitations: (1) an overemphasis on the United States, a nation where
religiosity is relatively high; (2) a neglect of highly secularized zones of the
world, where religiousness may be too weak to affect suicide; (3) restriction of
religiousness to religious affiliation, a construct which may miss capturing other
dimensions of religiousness such as the importance of religion in one’s life; and
(4) an overwhelming use of the nation as a unit of analysis, which masks varia-
tion in religiousness within nations. The present article addresses these limita-
tions by performing a cross-national test of the following hypothesis: The
greater the strength of subjective religiousness, the lower the suicide rate, using
small units of analysis for a secularized area of the world. All data refer to 162
regions within 22 European nations. Data were extracted from two large data-
bases, EUROSTAT and the European Social Surveys (ESS Round 4), and
merged using NUTS-2 (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units) regions
as the unit of analysis. Controls are incorporated for level of economic develop-
ment, education, and measures of economic strain. The results of a multiple
regression analysis demonstrated that controlling for the other constructs in the
model, religiousness is associated with lower suicide rates, confirming the
hypothesis. Even in secularized European nations, where there is a relatively
weak moral community to reinforce religion, religiousness acts as a protective
factor against suicide. Future work is needed to explore the relationship in
other culture zones of the world.
Suicide is a global social problem. It accounts
for nearly one million deaths per year. In
addition, there are approximately 20 million
suicide attempts each year (WHO, 2014).
The world’s rate of suicide has been increas-
ing steadily over the last half-century. For
example, the male rate rose from 17 per
100,000 males in 1950 to 28 per 100,000
males in 2000. Suicide among the young rep-
resents more years of life lost than for other
age groups. Globally, suicide now ranks as
the third leading cause of death for the young
(Stack &Kposowa, 2011;WHO, 2014).
Over more than a century of research,
scholars have foundmixed evidence regarding
the extent to which religion acts as a protec-
tive factor against suicide (e.g., Chon, 2015,
2017; Durkheim, 1897/1966; Hsieh, in press;
Morselli, 1882; Stack, 1981; Zhang, Wiec-
zorek, Conwell, & Tu, 2011; for reviews, see
Collucci & Martin, 2008; Koenig, King, &
Carson, 2012; Lester, 2000; Stack, 1982,
STEVEN STACK, Center for Suicide
Research, Troy, MI, and Wayne State Univer-
sity, Detroit, MI, USA; FREDERIQUE LAUBEPIN,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
Address correspondence to Steven Stack,
325 FAB, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI
48202; E-mail: steven_stack@hotmail.com
Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 49 (2) April 2019 371
© 2018 The American Association of Suicidology
DOI: 10.1111/sltb.12435
2000; Stack & Kposowa, 2016). For example,
in China, a highly secularized society where
only approximately 10% of the population
has a religious affiliation, religion does not
protect against suicide and sometimes actu-
ally is associated with greater risk (Zhang
et al., 2011). Further, a disproportionate
amount of the research has been based on the
United States (e.g., Bainbridge, 1989; Barkan,
Rocque, & Houle, 2013; Ellison, Burr, &
McCall, 1997; Stack, 2009; VanderWeele, Li,
Tsai, & Kawachi, 2016), a nation with a rela-
tively high level of religiosity (Chan &
Thambu, 2016; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). It
is not clear whether the results based on the
United States would generalize to other
nations marked by a variety of institutional
and cultural frameworks.
The United States has a relatively con-
servative culture marked by strong religious-
and family-oriented values (Inglehart &
Baker, 2000). In such nations, the interpreta-
tion of religion’s protective effect follows the
moral community hypothesis, a notion dating
back to Durkheim (1897/1966; Stack & Kpo-
sowa, 2016) that holds that the aggregate level
of religiousness in a group (e.g., neighbor-
hood, city, county, state, region, and nation)
will affect the attitudes and behaviors of indi-
viduals of its members, including the religious
and nonreligious. Religious teachings have a
greater effect on religious individuals if these
teachings are reinforced by those around
them in everyday life (Baier & Wright, 2001;
Stack & Kposowa, 2016; Stark, 1996). Hence,
given the relatively high level of cultural tra-
ditionalism in the United States (values of
family, religion, and nationalism), religion
might be more apt than average to affect
American individuals given the presence of a
strong moral community (Inglehart & Baker,
2000; Stack & Kposowa, 2016). Work on
more secularized nations, such as China and
those in Europe, is needed as a check on this
issue. There is some evidence that religion
aggravates suicide risk in some regions,
including western Europe and East Asia
(Hsieh, in press; Zhang et al., 2011). For
example, Hsieh (in press) determined that for
western Europe, the higher the church
attendance rates, the higher the suicide rates.
In southern Europe, church attendance rates
were unrelated to suicide rates. In East Asia, a
1% increase in church attendance rates was
associated with a 1% rise in suicide rates.
The present investigation tests a struc-
tural hypothesis for a sample of relatively sec-
ularized nations in Europe: The greater the
religiousness in a population, the lower its
suicide rate.
This study adds to the literature on
religion and suicide in several ways. First, it
is based on a sample of European nations, an
area of the world relatively high in secular-
ization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Kaufmann,
Goujon, & Skirbekk, 2012). In contrast, pre-
vious cross-national work on this issue has
included many less developed nations with
low levels of secularization such as Islamic
nations (e.g., Chon, 2015; Simpson & Con-
klin, 1989). The European context presents a
challenge for the moral community thesis, as
there are relatively fewer religious persons
available to reinforce the religiousness of
individuals (Stack & Kposowa, 2011).
Second, it is the first cross-national
study to employ a measure of subjective reli-
giosity: the mean level of the population’s
perceived religiousness. The self-reported
mean level of perceived religiousness can cap-
ture the meaning of religion along a variety of
dimensions. For example, of the 13 dimen-
sions of religion (Koenig, McCullough, &
Larson, 2001), the degree of subjective reli-
giousness can tap private religiousness such as
prayer, meditation, and closeness to God, as
well as public religiousness such as church
attendance. It can also capture persons who
are devoted to their religious beliefs and who
give meaning to their suffering through chan-
nels of religious coping (Stack, 1983; Stack &
Kposowa, 2016). This particular metric has
advantages over many alternative measures
such as being a member of a religious group.
Sheer membership may be for reasons of
maintaining an air of social acceptability and
have little consequences in everyday life (Koe-
nig et al., 2001, 2012).
Third, the present investigation cap-
tures the variation in suicide and its correlates
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that exists within nations. It does so using
regions within nations as our unit of analysis.
By matching suicide rates and religiousness
levels for areas within nations, we are more
apt to discover the true nature of the link
between these population characteristics.
Generally, small units of analysis can be more
homogeneous than larger units of analysis.
This strategy is consistent with within-nation
studies in the United States (e.g., Bainbridge,
1989; Barkan et al., 2013; Ellison et al.,
1997). Sometimes studies that use small units
of analysis that closely match local population
characteristics (religion and suicide) find
associations, while studies based on the use of
large units such as states do not (Stack, 2000).
We are able to make this contribution
through an innovative strategy for merging
together data from two large cross-national
data sets.
Finally, the religiousness–suicide rela-
tionship is assessed using suicide deaths as
the dependent variable. This is in contrast
to most of the previous work where the
analysis of the relationship has been limited
to forms of suicidality that fall short of
death, such as nonfatal attempts and suicide
ideation (Koenig et al., 2001, 2012; Stack,
2000). To the extent that deaths from sui-
cide and nonfatal forms of suicide represent
two different populations, it is important to
study deaths separately (Stack, 2000).
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON
RELIGION AND SUICIDE DEATHS
A disproportionate amount of research
on religion and suicide is either based on the
United States or includes a large number of
the less secularized nations of the world (e.g.,
Bainbridge, 1989; Barkan et al., 2013; Chon,
2015, 2017; Ellison et al., 1997; Stack, 2009;
Stack & Kposowa, 2016; VanderWeele
et al., 2016). In contrast, in this study we
focused on the cross-national, aggregate
analysis of suicide rates in more secularized
nations. The existing relevant structural
cross-national studies are listed in Table 1.
Six of these nine published studies contain
many nations that are low in secularization
(Chon, 2015, 2017; Huang, 1996; Moore,
2015; Simpson & Conklin, 1989; Stack,
1981).
The sample of 22 nations used in this
study is marked by relatively high levels of
secularization, a finding consistent with
research using alternate measures of reli-
giousness, such as organizational religiosity
(Koenig et al., 2001, 20). Church attendance
is a widely used reverse measure of seculariza-
tion (Kaufmann et al., 2012; Koenig et al.,
2012). Using the fourth wave of the World
Values Surveys (WVS), Stack and Kpo-
sowa (2011) measured secularization as the
national mean on the WVS item “Apart from
weddings, funerals and christenings, how
often do you attend religious services these
days: from 1 = never through 8 more than once
a week.” The mean level was relatively high in
the Islamic culture zone (e.g., Bangladesh:
5.8, Iran: 5.5, Indonesia: 6.4, Pakistan: 7.08,
Philippines: 6.10), among Hindus (India:
5.3), in Latin America (e.g., Mexico: 5.9,
Peru: 5.83), and in Africa (Nigeria: 7.39,
South Africa: 5.84, Zimbabwe: 6.27). The
United States, with a mean church attendance
of 5.31, is closer in church attendance to these
less developed nations than to Europe. Eur-
ope is host to many of the most secularized
nations (e.g., Belgium: 3.32, Bulgaria: 3.79,
Czechoslovakia: 2.52, Estonia: 3.08, Finland:
3.16, France: 2.38, Germany: 3.22, Hungary:
3.03, the Netherlands: 3.12, Slovenia: 3.85,
Sweden: 2.48, and United Kingdom: 2.75).
All these secularized nations are included in
this study. To the extent that low church
attendance is related to overall lower reli-
giousness, we would expect that this study’s
focus on relatively secularized European
regions would weaken the religiousness–
suicide relationship. The assumed lower pro-
portion of highly religious persons would
tend to weaken the moral community avail-
able to reinforce religiousness and, as such,
protect against suicide (Stack & Kposowa,
2016).
The hypothesis that religion acts as a
protective factor against suicide has been
tested using a variety of measures of
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religion (e.g., Chon, 2015, 2017; Fernquist &
Cutright, 1998; Moore, 2015; Stack, 1983;
see review in Stack & Kposowa, 2016). The
nine previous studies shown in Table 1 use
such measures as attendance at church ser-
vices (Chon, 2015), the proportion of reli-
gious books produced (Fernquist & Cutright,
1998; Stack, 1983), and various measures of
the proportion of the population belonging
to a number of religious denominations and
combinations of religious affiliations (Chon,
2017; Huang, 1996; Simpson & Conklin,
1989; Stack, 1981).
This study proposes a new measure
based on subjective religiosity, which is one
of the 13 principal measures discussed by
Koenig et al. (2001, 21). Subjective religios-
ity is commonly measured with a question
about how religious the subject considers
himself or herself. It may capture elements
of the other 12 dimensions of religion such
as religious affiliation, belief or orthodoxy,
organizational activities, private activities,
religious coping, experience, knowledge,
and commitment. All 13 measures have lim-
itations. In this study, we take the mean
level of subjective religiosity in a region as
the structural measure, and we feel this
measure generally has fewer shortcomings
compared to others.
For example, the percentage of the
population that is Catholic is a common
measure. However, there has been a trend
toward convergence between Catholics and
Protestants in religious practice and beliefs
over time. Hence, the percentage of the
TABLE 1
Cross-National Studies (1981–2017) on the Relationship Between Religion Indicators and General
Suicide Rates: Lead Author, Number of Countries in Sample, Type of Suicide Rate, Religion












Chon (2015) 83 TSR Religious services* 6
Chon (2015) 83 TSR Religious belief index* 6







Fernquist (1998) 21 MSR %Religious books* 4
Fernquist (1998) 21 FSR %Religious books* 4
Fernquist (2007) 8 MSR %Religious books* 7
Fernquist (2007) 8 FSR %Religious books 7
Huang (1996) 48 TSR MSR FSR (85% + Muslim or Catholic)* 7
Moore (2015) 41 TSR Religious fractionalization* 4






Stack (1981) 37 TSR MSR FSR %Catholic 3
Stack (1983) 25 TSR %Religious books* 2
Stack (1983) 25 6/8 FSR %Religious books* 2
Stack (1983) 25 1/8 MSR %Religious books* 2
TSR, total suicide rate; FSR, female suicide rate; MSR, male suicide rate.
*Variable statistically significant.
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population that is Catholic is less likely to
predict suicide rates today than in Durk-
heim’s period (Barkan et al., 2013; Chon,
2017; Ellison et al., 1997; Lester, 2000; Stack,
1981, 2000; Stack & Kposowa, 2011). For
example, a recent review of 30 studies found
that Catholics were at lower risk in only 11
studies. In six investigations, Catholics were
actually at greater risk, and in 13, Catholics
were at the same level of risk as other denomi-
nations (Koenig et al., 2012). A recent study
of 124 nations reported that those with a 50%
or greater Catholic population did not have a
lower rate of suicide (Chon, 2017).
In addition to a focus on a more secu-
larized section of the world, and the employ-
ment of a subjective measure of religiousness,
the third contribution of this study is that it is
based on smaller units of analysis than the
previous nine studies. It is able to measure
variation in both religion and suicide rates
within each country’s regions. All nine previ-
ous studies were based on large units of analy-
sis, the nation. They were unable to assess
within-nation variation in religion and sui-
cide. This study follows previous work on sin-
gle nations where suicide rates are closely
matched with population characteristics rates
in smaller geographic units such as cities
(Bainbridge, 1989; Ellison et al., 1997) or
provinces within Italy (Stack & Laubepin,
2016).
Briefly, none of the nine previous inve-
stigations included a subjective measure of
religiosity. In addition, all are based on a large
unit of analysis, the nation. This can mask
important variation in both suicide and reli-
giousness within nations. Most do not focus
on the more secularized European nations.
This study fills these gaps.
METHODS
European regions within nations are
the unit of analysis. These help capture intra-
country variation. Data were extracted from
two large databases: European Social Survey
(2008), Round 4, and EUROSTAT (Statisti-
cal Office of the European Communities,
2016). For administrative and statistical pur-
poses, the European Union relies on three
categories of regional divisions (or NUTS:
Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial
Units), ranging from macro- (NUTS-1) to
micro- (NUTS-3) regional divisions. 2008
NUTS-2 data are used in this analyses. The
year 2008 was selected because it offered the
most complete data for the greatest number
of countries/regions. In cases where variables
were not available at the NUTS-2 level,
NUTS-3 level data were downloaded then
aggregated at the NUTS-2 level. The result-
ing data sets of EUROSTAT data and ESS
data were checked region by region to ensure
that they matched. If a region was missing
from one data set, that region was deleted in
the other. These data sets were then merged
(m:1) into one data set containing data on
162 regions of 22 European countries (coun-
tries are listed in Appendix A). EUROSTAT
provided complete data on suicide rates, as
well as education, gross domestic product
(GDP), poverty, and unemployment for all
162 regions in the study. While these data
are collected by member states’ statistical
authorities, EUROSTAT’s role is to subject
them to rigorous harmonization methods to
provide data that allow for accurate compar-
isons between countries and/or regions.
Complete data for the variables of interest
were available for 36,390 of the 41,753
respondents in ESS.
The central dependent variable is the
rate of suicide or the number of suicides in the
region per 100,000 population of the region.
To control for chance fluctuations, these rates
are calculated as 3-year averages (2007–09).
The main independent variable is reli-
giousness. Religiousness is measured in terms
of self-reported subjective religiosity. Specifi-
cally, it is the average score of a region on the
ESS question, “How religious are you?”
Responses are coded on a 10-point spec-
trum from 0 = Not religious at all, through
10 = Very religious.
That the nations in this European sam-
ple of 162 regions within 22 countries are
among the world’s most secularized is wit-
nessed by their mean levels of religiousness as
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measured by mean levels of church atten-
dance. Church attendance data are among the
most available over time and space and are
used extensively to measure secularization
(e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2012). Based on the
fourth wave of the WVS (Stack & Kposowa,
2011), the mean for 69 nations is 4.56. There
are WVS survey data for 19 of the nations in
the present sample. A working definition of
the world’s most secularized nations can be
those with means at least one half of a stan-
dard deviation (1.26) below the world mean
(i.e., 3.32 or below). A majority of the nations
in the present sample fit this criterion (Bel-
gium: 3.32, Czechoslovakia: 2.52, Estonia:
3.08, Finland: 3.16, France: 2.38, Germany:
3.22, Hungary: 3.03, the Netherlands: 3.12,
Sweden: 2.48, United Kingdom: 2.75). The
only other nations meeting this cutoff for sec-
ularization are disproportionately in Europe
or East Europe (Denmark: 2.38, Latvia: 3.24,
Russia: 2.45, Iceland: 3.13, China: 1.42, and
Vietnam: 2.71). However, the present sample
does include some nations with low secular-
ization (Ireland: 6.06 and Poland: 6.07).
Control variables are drawn from previ-
ous cross-national research (e.g., Chon, 2015,
2017; Durkheim, 1897/1966; Fernquist &
Cutright, 1998; Simpson & Conklin, 1989;
Stack, 1983). The first control variable is edu-
cation. Education is viewed as contributing to
secularization to the extent that it increases
critical thinking, scientific inquiry, and weak-
ens religious authority (Durkheim, 1897/
1966; Stack & Laubepin, 2016). It is extracted
from EUROSTAT and defined as the per-
centage of pupils and students in all levels of
education, or percentage of the population
that is enrolled in school (all levels of educa-
tion). Because of EU mandates and classifica-
tion schemes, the data on education provided
by EUROSTAT are of fairly high quality, but
education systems and degree structures differ
between countries, which may affect certain
figures in spite of data harmonization efforts.
Using enrollment numbers is a cruder but
safer way of measuring education than using
degree completion, for instance, which may
be influenced by country-level differences in
degree structure.
The final three variables, also extracted
from EUROSTAT and drawn from models
in the previous literature (e.g., Chon, 2015,
2017; Durkheim, 1897/1966; Fernquist,
2007; Fernquist & Cutright, 1998; Simpson
& Conklin, 1989; Stack, 1983), provide con-
trols for economic conditions. Economic
growth and prosperity can enhance material-
istic values, which can replace or weaken reli-
gious values. First, the level of economic
development is measured as per capita GDP.
Second, there is the presence of poverty, to
varying degrees, within a given level of pros-
perity. From the standpoint of the theory of
economic strain and deviant behavior
(Agnew, 1992; Zhang et al., 2011), a gap
between economic goals and the means to
these goals, herein the incidence of impover-
ishment, can promote deviant behaviors,
including suicide. Durkheim (1897/1966)
argued, however, that poverty was a school
for social constraint and, as such, would act as
a protective factor. Graphical analysis indi-
cates that this variable is skewed so it was
treated with a logarithmic transformation.
Finally, a measure of unemployment, another
commonly used measure of strain, was
included. The unemployment rate is defined
as the percentage of the active age population
that was not employed during the reference
week, had actively sought work during the
past 4 weeks, and was ready to begin working
immediately or within 2 weeks. This variable
was also marked with skewness and so was
also log transformed. Descriptive statistics
are provided in Table 2.
We note that there is substantial vari-
ation in religiousness within our 162
regions. While the mean is 4.74, as reported
in Table 2, the standard deviation is 3.01.
While the block of 22 nations is, as discussed
earlier, one of the most secularized in the
world, there is, nevertheless, evidence of sub-
stantial variation within it.
Data were analyzed using Stata (Stata-
Corp, LLC, College Station, TX 77845).
The ESS population weight [pspwght] was
applied. Bivariate correlation coefficients
(Table 3) suggest that multicollinearity is not
present.
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Variance inflation factors (VIFs) con-
firmed an absence of severe multicollinear-
ity: The highest VIF score (GDP) is 2.24.
All other scores are under 2.
ANALYSIS
The results of the multivariate regres-
sion analysis are presented in Table 4. Con-
trolling for the other predictor variables, the
greater the religiousness of a region, the
lower its suicide rate. The coefficient of the
religiousness variable is over 19 times its
standard error. This meets the test of signifi-
cance at the p < .001 level. Controlling for
the other predictors, the greater the index of
education, the greater the suicide rate. This
measure of tolerance was anticipated to act
as a risk factor. The level of economic devel-
opment term has a negative sign indicating
the higher the level of economic develop-
ment, the lower the suicide rate. The more
economically developed European regions
enjoy a higher standard of living and lower
risk of suicide. This finding would be antici-
pated from the parabolic nature of the rela-
tionship between economic development and
suicide reported elsewhere (Stack, 1993).
The results on the two economic strain
measures were mixed. Controlling for the
other variables, the higher the poverty rate, the
lower the suicide rate, a relationship consistent
with Durkheim (1897/1966). The unemploy-
ment rate was unrelated to the suicide rate.
According to the R-squared statistic,
13.3% of the variance is explained by the
model. That the model provides a reason-
able fit to the data on suicide rates is indi-
cated by the significant F statistic.
CONCLUSION
Previous cross-national research has
neglected subjective measures of the strength
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables in the Analyses, European Regions, 2008a
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Suicide rate 162 12.99 5.83 2.4 34.5
Religiousness 162 4.74 3.01 0 10
% enrolled in education programs 162 21.87 3.13 14.2 35.9
GDP 162 24,268.36 12,991.17 3,000 64,400
Poverty rate 162 22.53 7.81 8.8 54.5
Unemployment rate 162 6.55 3.02 1.8 20
a3-year averages (2007–09) are used for suicide and homicide rates. Source: European Social Sur-
veys and EUROSTAT.
TABLE 3
Correlation Coefficients Between All the Variables and Levels of Significance (N = 162 European
Regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Suicide rate 1.00
(2) Religiousness .11*** 1.00
(3) Education .21*** .02 1.00
(4) GDP .14*** .03*** .40*** 1.00
(5) Poverty .05*** .13*** .34*** .56*** 1.00
(6) Unemployment .03*** .04*** .13*** .38*** .51*** 1.00
***p < .001.
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of religiousness in a population as protective
factors against suicide (Chon, 2015, 2017;
Fernquist, 2007; Fernquist & Cutright,
1998; Huang, 1996; Moore, 2015; Simpson
& Conklin, 1989; Stack, 1981, 1983). The
measures of religion have included variables
such as religious affiliation and religious
books, but have fallen short of constructs
that measure subjective religiousness, the
national mean of the overall strength of reli-
giousness reported by individuals.
Through an innovative merging of
data from two international data archives,
the present study was able, for the first time,
to employ a measure of subjective religious-
ness for a large number of nations. The pre-
sent study is the first cross-national study of
suicide rates that employs the mean level of
self-reported, subjective religiousness as its
principal measure. In addition, this investiga-
tion is also the first of its kind to employ
regions within nations for its units of analy-
sis, thereby capturing within-nation variation
that was missed in previous studies using sets
of whole nations (Chon, 2015, 2017; Fern-
quist, 2007; Fernquist & Cutright, 1998;
Huang, 1996; Moore, 2015; Simpson &
Conklin, 1989; Stack, 1981, 1983). Impor-
tantly, the secularized European context of
the present study provides a special challenge
for testing the hypothesis given Europe’s
assumed weaker moral community. The
results based on 162 regions within 22
European nations show that the mean level
of subjective religiousness predicts suicide
rates. This association is independent of a set
of socioeconomic control variables used in
previous investigations (e.g., Chon, 2015,
2017; Fernquist, 2007; Stack & Laubepin,
2016).
The present study has some of the same
limitations as previous structural studies.
There is the danger of the ecological fallacy.
For example, as the study is, such as its prede-
cessors, based on aggregated data (Chon,
2015, 2017; Fernquist, 2007; Fernquist &
Cutright, 1998; Huang, 1996; Moore, 2015;
Simpson & Conklin, 1989; Stack, 1981,
1983), it is not possible to determine how
many of the suicides are high or low in reli-
giousness. Caution should be exercised in
applying these structural findings to investi-
gations on individuals. Further, the nations
under review include former communist
nations as well as noncommunist European
nations. Future work might explore the
model within these two culture zones (Ingle-
hart & Baker, 2000).
Nevertheless, there is growing evi-
dence from single-nation studies that religion
acts as a protective factor against suicide at
the individual level of analysis (Kleiman &
Liu, 2014; Stack, 2009; VanderWeele et al.,
2016). This evidence includes a recent cohort
investigation of 89,708 nurses followed over a
15-year period. Those attending religious
TABLE 4
Religiousness and Controls as Predictors of Regional Suicide Rates (N = 162 Regions in 22 European
Nations)
Independent variable Regression coefficient SE t Statistic
Religiousness .206*** .0108 19.04
Tolerance (Education) .595*** .0112 53.28
Level of economic development .000150*** .00000259 58.02
Economic strain
Poverty 2.125*** .106 20.08
Joblessness .129 .0705 1.82
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services at least once per week at baseline
were fully five times less likely than those
never attending to die through a suicide
(VanderWeele et al., 2016). A cross-sectional
analysis of individual-level data on 15,739
deaths from the National Mortality Follow-
Back Survey also established religiousness as
a predictor of suicide deaths. Each unit
increase in an index of religious activities
decreased the risk of a suicide death by 16%
(Stack, 2009). Further work is needed, how-
ever, to assess the aggregate-based findings
of the present study. Work on other nations,
including both aggregate level and individ-
ual levels of analysis (as well as work using
multilevel models), is needed as the neces-
sary data become available.
It is not fully clear how religiousness
reduces suicide risk. There are numerous pos-
sible pathways between religiousness and sui-
cide completions. These include factors
already known to be related to religiousness.
For example, religiousness is associated with
many areas of well-being, including low odds
of drug and alcohol abuse, physical health,
marital stability, lower depression, and social
support (Koenig et al., 2012; Robins & Fiske,
2009). For example, 86% of 278 studies
reported that religion reduced alcohol abuse,
an important risk factor for suicide, while
73% of 40 studies found that religion reduced
hopelessness, also a risk factor (Koenig et al.,
2012). In particular, the social support offered
by coreligionists to suicidal individuals can
reduce thwarted belongingness and perceived
burdensomeness, elements of the interper-
sonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005; Robins
& Fiske, 2009). Eighty-two percent of 74
studies, mostly at the individual level of analy-
sis, found that religion enhanced social sup-
port (Koenig et al., 2012, 303). Conceivably,
the mean level of such support in regions
might be associated with lower suicide rates.
As data become available, further work is
needed to include some of these factors to test
for possible mediator effects between reli-
giousness and suicide rates. This work could
clarify the pathways between religiousness
and suicide.
Future work might focus on religious
beliefs as the data become available. Reli-
gious commitment theory (Stack, 1983;
Stack & Kposowa, 2016) argued that a few
core beliefs such as a belief in hell, God,
and an afterlife might be enough to prevent
suicide. For example, belief in a reward of a
blissful afterlife for those suffering in
earthly life might assuage or soften suicidal
tendencies among those who suffer from
stressful life events such as divorce, death of
a loved one, unemployment, physical dis-
abilities, and so on. Suffering can be more
readily endured if salvation and heavenly
glory are offered as rewards for persever-
ing through these trials of life. There is
one recent cross-national investigation that
found an association between national levels
of religious beliefs and suicide rates (Chon,
2015). Such beliefs can function as a coping
mechanism (Stack & Kposowa, 2016).
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APPENDIX A





























Suicide rates are per 100,000 people.
Source: Statistical Office of the European Com-
munities (2016).
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